1	LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS		
2	Kirby J. Smith, Esq., Bar No. 414 1700 Bank of America Plaza		
3	300 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101		
4	(702) 383-8888 ksmith@lionelsawyer.com		
5	Attorneys for Defendant Sprint Nextel Corporation		
6			
7	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
8	DISTRICT (	OF NEVADA	
9	JODI ALLERTON, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,		
10		NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION	
11	Plaintiffs,		
12	SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION and JOHN DOES I through XXX, actual names		
13	and number unknown,		
14	Defendants.	,	
15	NOTICE OF	REMOVAL	
16	Defendant Sprint Nextel Corporation ("Sprint" or "Defendant"), by its attorneys, Lione		
17 18	Sawyer & Collins, hereby files this Notice of Removal of the above-captioned action to the		
19	United States District Court for the District of N	levada from the Eighth Judicial District Court of	
20	Nevada, Clark County, where the action is now pending, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 an		
21	1446. In support of this Notice of Removal, Defendant now states:		
22	1. The action was commenced on or about June 12, 2009, under Case No. A-09-		
23	592383-C in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Clark County. Service of the		
24	Summons and Class Action Complaint was completed on June 22, 2009. Defendant filed its		
25 26	Answer to the Complaint on July 20, 2009. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1446(a), a copy of all		
27	process, pleadings, and orders received by Defendant, as well as Defendant's Answer, is attache		
28 ER	hereto as Exhibit 1. No further proceedings have	e been had herein.	

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- 2. This Notice of Removal has been filed within thirty days of service upon Defendant of a copy of the Class Action Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1446(b).
- 3. The State Court Action alleges claims for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for violation of Nevada's Labor Law, N.R.S. § 608.180, for breach of contract under Nevada law, and for violation of N.R.S. § 608.040. (See Ex. 1.)
- 4. This is a civil action over which this Court has original "federal question" jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as well as original jurisdiction due to diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Therefore, this civil action may be removed to this Court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1441(a) and (b).

# FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND REMOVAL (28 U.S.C §§ 1331, 1441, 1446)

- 5. This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff Jodi Allerton ("Allerton") asserts in her Class Action Complaint a cause of action under a federal statute: the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. As a civil action founded on a right or claim arising under the laws of the United States, this action is properly removal to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b).
- 6. This Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law causes of action in the Class Action Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as the state law causes of action are related to the FLSA claim by subject matter, time period, and/or alleged action.

# DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND REMOVAL (28 U.S.C §§ 1332, 1441, 1446)

7. In addition, this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and the action may be removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) because it is a civil action

between citizens of different states and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of \$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

- 8. In accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), complete diversity of the parties exists and is shown on the face of the Complaint, as follows:
  - A. In her Complaint, Allerton alleges that she is a resident of Clark County Nevada. (See Ex. 1, ¶ 1.) Thus, Sprint is informed and believes and on that basis alleges that Allerton was at the time of the filing of this action and still is a citizen of the State of Nevada.
  - B. As alleged in the Complaint, Sprint is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Kansas. (See Ex. 1, ¶ 2.) In addition, Sprint's principal place of business is 200 Sprint Parkway, Overland Park, Kansas 66251. As a result, Sprint is a citizen of Kansas, but not of Nevada, and was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business in Nevada.
  - C. Although Allerton has named as defendants "John Does 1 through XXX, actual names and numbers unknown," the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names is to be disregarded for the purposes of determining diversity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
- 9. In the Complaint, Allerton seeks an unspecified amount of damages for a series of alleged wage and hour violations, as follows:
  - A. Under the first claim for relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA, Allerton alleges that Sprint "willfully failed to make said overtime and/or minimum wage payments by having the plaintiff... perform 'off the clock' work." (Ex. 1, ¶ 14.) As recovery for this claim, Allerton seeks "a judgment against defendants for unpaid overtime wages and/or

minimum wages, such sums to be determined by an accounting of the hours worked by, and wages actually paid to, such plaintiffs, and also seeks an award of liquidated damages, attorney's fees, interest and costs as provided for by the FLSA." (Ex. 1, ¶ 16.)

- B. Under the second claim for relief pursuant to Nevada's labor law, Allerton alleges that she and other alleged similarly situated employees were not paid required wages of time and one-half their normal hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week. (Ex. 1, ¶ 19.) As recovery for this claim, Allerton seeks "a judgment against defendant for overtime wages, such sums to be determined by an accounting of the hours worked by, and wages actually paid to, the plaintiff and those similarly situated, and also seeks an award of attorney's fees, interest and costs, and suitable equitable relief, as provided for by Nevada Law." (Ex. 1, ¶ 21.)
- C. Under the third claim for relief for breach of contract, Allerton alleges

  Sprint breached an alleged contract with her "by failing to pay such

  promised hourly wages, specifically by failing to pay the plaintiff anything

  whatsoever for certain hours or portions thereof that she performed work

  for the defendant." (Ex. 1, ¶ 25.) As recovery for this claim, Allerton

  seeks "a judgment against defendant for the unpaid wages owed to the

  named plaintiff . . . as a result of the defendants' breach of its contract

  with the plaintiff . . . and also seeks an award of attorney's fees, interest

  and costs, as provided for by Nevada Law." (Ex. 1, ¶ 26.)

- D. Under the fourth claim for relief under N.R.S. § 608.040, Allerton alleges

  Sprint failed to pay her and other allegedly similarly situated individuals
  earned but unpaid wages at thee time of their discharge or resignation.

  (Ex. 1, ¶¶ 28-29.) As recovery for this claim, Allerton seeks "a judgment
  against the defendants for the penalty prescribed by Nevada Revised

  Statutes § 608.040, to wit, for a sum equal to thirty days wages, along with
  interest, costs and attorney's fees." (Ex. 1, ¶ 30.)
- 10. Thus, although Allerton has not specified the precise amount of damages sought, it is clear from the face of the Complaint that she seeks damages for alleged unpaid overtime wages, alleged unpaid minimum wages, alleged unpaid wages, statutory penalties under Nevada law, including a sum equal to thirty (30) days' wages, liquidated damages under the FLSA, suitable equitable relief, and attorney's fees. (See Ex. 1 ¶¶ 16, 21, 26, 30.) In addition, Allerton seeks "such other relief as the Court deems just." (Ex. 1, at 8-9.)
- 11. The nature of the numerous wage and hour claims she attempts to plead, the penalties she seeks, and the attorney's fees sought reveals that the amount in controversy "more likely than not" exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of \$75,000. See Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming district court's determination that, on a preponderance of evidence standard, defendant had successfully established that amount in controversy exceeded \$75,000 despite plaintiffs' allegations to the contrary); see also Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is met where state-court complaint unclear or ambiguous as to amount in controversy).
- 12. The removing defendant may make the requisite showing by either (1) demonstrating that it is "facially apparent" from the complaint that the claims are likely to

exceed \$75,000 (e.g., claims of punitive damages, claims entitling plaintiff to recovery attorneys' fees, etc.), or (2) setting forth facts in the notice of removal that support a finding of the requisite amount under a preponderance of evidence standard. See, e.g., Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1999); Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699 (citing Sanchez, 102 F.3d at 404).

- Allerton's four claims for relief, premised on her laundry list of alleged wage and hour violations, her claims for civil penalties, liquidated damages, and equitable relief, and her claim for attorney's fees, that, more likely than not, the jurisdictional amount is exceeded even though the Complaint fails to allege a specific amount of damages. See Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 700 (""[W]here an underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys' fees, either with mandatory or discretionary language, such fees may be included in the amount in controversy") (quoting Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 241 (1943) (amount in controversy requirement met if plaintiff "might recover" award of compensatory and punitive damages in excess of amount in controversy requirement); Jackson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 976 F. Supp. 1450, 1454 (S.D. Ala. 1997) (appropriate measure of amount in controversy is the litigation value assuming all allegations of complaint are true and jury returns verdict for plaintiffs on all claims made in the complaint).
- 14. In addition, while Sprint vehemently denies Allerton's allegations, including that Allerton is entitled to any monetary relief, penalties or equitable relief whatsoever, Allerton's purported claims for damages exceed \$75,000 based on *Guglielmino* and the other cases cited herein as follows:

- A. Allerton was employed by Sprint from November 5, 2007 through March 12, 2009. (See Affidavit of Taylor Kitchin, attached hereto as Exhibit 2.)

  Upon her departure, Allerton's hourly wage was \$12.8625. (Id.) During her employment with Sprint, Allerton worked, on average, 42.88 hours per week, including paid time off. (Id.) Thus, on average, Allerton clocked 2.88 of overtime hours per week.
- B. Under the first claim for relief, Allerton seeks damages for Sprint's alleged failure to pay her for time she worked "off the clock." Pursuant to the FLSA, Allerton's wage claims date back two (2) years from the date she filed this Complaint. *See* 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Because Allerton filed her Complaint on June 12, 2009, her FLSA claims date back to June 12, 2007 *i.e.*, prior to the date her employment with Sprint began. Even assuming, on average, that Allerton worked three (3) unpaid hours of overtime per week during her employment with Sprint, which was 70.57 weeks, at \$12.8625/hour, damages for such a violation would equal \$4084.68 (70.57 weeks x [\$12.8625/hour x 3 hours x 1.5]). With liquidated damages, damages for a this period would equal \$8169.36.
- C. Under the second claim for relief, Allerton seeks overtime wages for time she allegedly worked "off the clock" and for time in which Sprint allegedly improperly calculated overtime wages. Pursuant to Nevada law, such claims have a three-year statute of limitations. N.R.S. § 11.190(3)(a). Again, assuming that Allerton worked three (3) hours of unpaid overtime per week during her employment with Sprint, damages

for a three-year time period (which includes all 70.57 weeks of Allerton's employment with Sprint) would equal \$4084.68.

- D. Under the third claim for relief, Allerton alleges that Sprint breached a contract to pay certain set hourly wages when it failed to pay her for "off the clock" work. Pursuant to Nevada law, breach of contract claims have a six-year statute of limitations. N.R.S. § 11.190(1)(b). Assuming that Allerton worked three (3) hours of unpaid overtime per week during her employment with Sprint, damages for a six-year time period (which includes all 70.57 weeks of Allerton's employment with Sprint) would equal \$4084.68.
- E. Under the fourth claim for relief, Allerton seeks a sum equal to thirty days of her wages pursuant to N.R.S. § 608.040. Thirty days of Allerton's wages is equal to \$3087.00.
- Finally, Allerton seeks attorney's fees, and both the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and Nevada state law, N.R.S. § 608.140, provide for the award of attorney's fees to a successful litigant. Under such circumstances, the amount claimed thereunder may be taken into account in determining whether the jurisdictional minimum has been reached. *See, e.g., Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia*, 142 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998). A consideration of Allerton's attorney's fees that would be recoverable in the event she prevails further demonstrates that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the \$75,000 threshold.
- G. Allerton's claims for attorney's fees would conservatively increase this number by at least an additional \$60,000. Plaintiff purports to bring

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claims on behalf of herself and other alleged "similarly situated" individuals under both federal and state laws for the underpayment of or failure to pay wages. In addition, Allerton seeks penalties for failure to pay wages upon discharge or resignation. Thus, the litigation will encompass numerous closely-contested claims asserted on behalf of numerous current and former employees and will almost certainly result in extensive litigation activity, particularly because the bulk of Allerton's claims allege "off the clock" work that will be difficult to quantify by record evidence. Based on defense counsel's experience litigating similar claims, it is more likely than not that Allerton's attorney's fees will be at least \$60,000.

- 15. Therefore, the Court has original jurisdiction over the Complaint, and each alleged cause of action contained therein, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Complaint and the State Court Action may be removed to this Court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
- 16. Allerton also has named as defendants "John Does 1 through XXX, actual names and numbers unknown." Thus far, to Sprint's knowledge, none of the John Doe defendants has been served. In any event, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names is to be disregarded for the purposes of determining diversity. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
- 17. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), Defendant has the right to remove this case from the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Clark County, to this Court because the District Court for the District of Nevada is the District embracing the place where the action is pending.
- 18. A copy of this Notice of Removal will be filed with the Clerk of the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Clark County, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).

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19.	Promptly after the filing of this Notice of Removal, written notice of the filing of
this Notice of	Removal will be given to Allerton as required by law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).

- 20. By filing this Notice of Removal, Defendant does not waive any defenses which may be available to it.
- 21. In the event this Court should have any questions about the propriety of removal or may be inclined to remand this action, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court issue an order to show cause why the case should not be remanded, affording the parties an opportunity to provide the Court with full briefing and argument. Furthermore, should Allerton voluntarily withdraw her first claim of relief pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and move to remand this case to the state court, she should be required to stipulate that her damages shall not exceed \$75,000. Such a procedure is warranted since a remand order is not subject to review.
  - 22. This Notice is executed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

WHEREFORE, Defendant hereby removes this action from the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Clark County, to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.

Dated: July 1, 2009

LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS

By:

Kirby J. Smith

1700 Bank of America Plaza

300 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101

(702) 383-8888

ksmith@lionelsawyer.com Attorneys for Defendant

Sprint Nextel Corporation

**CERTIFICATE OF MAILING** I certify that on the 21st day of July, 2009, I deposited a true and correct copy of the above NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION in the United States mail, postage prepaid at Las Vegas, Nevada, to the last known address of: Leon Greenberg, Esq. Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 633 South 4th Street, Suite 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Christian Gabroy, Esq. Gabroy Law Offices 170 S. Green Valley Parkway, Suite 280 Henderson, Nevada 89012 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

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## EXHIBIT 1

## EXHIBIT 1

LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS 1 Kirby J. Smith, Esq., Bar No. 414 2 1700 Bank of America Plaza 120 5 cm 20 300 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101 3 (702) 383-8888 4 ksmith@lionelsawyer.com Attorneys for Defendant Sprint Nextel Corporation 5 6 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 JODI ALLERTON, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated. 10 Case No. A-09-592383-C Department X Plaintiffs. 11 DEFENDANT SPRINT NEXTEL SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION and 12 CORPORATION'S ANSWER TO JOHN DOES I through XXX, actual names PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT and number unknown. 13 14 Defendants. 15 16 Defendant Sprint Nextel Corporation ("Sprint or "Defendant"), for its answer and 17 affirmative defenses to Plaintiff Jodi Allerton's ("Plaintiff" or "Allerton") Class Action 18 19 Complaint for alleged Violation of State and Federal Statutes and Breach of Contract (the 20 "Complaint"), states as follows: 21 AS TO "PARTIES AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENT" 22 1. Upon information and belief, admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of 23 the Complaint. 24 Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 2 of the Complaint, 2. 25 except admits that Sprint is a corporation existing and established pursuant to the laws of the 26 State of Kansas. 27

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- 3. Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 of the Complaint.
- 4. The allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the Complaint constitute a legal assertion that Defendant is not required to admit or to deny. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 4 of the Complaint.
  - 5. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 5 of the Complaint.
- 6. The allegations contained in Paragraph 6 of the Complaint constitute a legal assertion that Defendant is not required to admit or to deny. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 6 of the Complaint.

### AS TO "THE PROPOSED CLASS CLAIMS AND PARTIES"

- 7. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 7 of the Complaint.
- 8. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 8 of the Complaint.
- 9. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 9 of the Complaint.
- 10. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 10 of the Complaint.
- 11. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 11 of the Complaint.
- 12. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 12 of the Complaint.

AS TO "A FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF JODI ALLERTON AND ALL OTHER PERSONS WHO CHOOSE TO FILE A WRITTEN CONSENT TO JOIN THIS ACTION AS A PLAINTIFF PURSUANT TO 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT"

13. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 13 of the Complaint, except admits that Allerton purports to bring the First Claim for Relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of herself and all other alleged similarly situated persons who consent in writing to join this action as plaintiffs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

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14. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 14 of the Complaint. except admits that certain provisions of the FLSA entitle employees to a minimum wage and an overtime hourly wage of time and one-half of their regular hourly wage for all hours worked in excess for forty hours per work, and that Allerton was employed by Sprint in a telephone customer call service center.

- 15. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 15 of the Complaint.
- 16. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 16 of the Complaint, except admits that Allerton, on behalf of herself and all other alleged similarly situated plaintiffs who consent in writing to join this action, purports to seek a judgment against Defendant for alleged unpaid overtime wages and/or minimum wages, an award of liquidated damages, attorney's fees, interest, and costs as provided for by the FLSA.

AS TO "A SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF JODI ALLERTON AND ALL PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED PURSUANT TO NEVADA'S LABOR LAW"

- 17. Defendant repeats and realleges its answers to Paragraphs 1 through 16 as if set forth in full herein in response to Paragraph 17 of the Complaint.
- 18. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 18 of the Complaint, except admits that Allerton purports to bring the Second Claim for Relief pursuant to NRS § 608.180.
- 19. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 19 of the Complaint, except admits that NRS § 608.018 governs compensation for overtime.
  - 20. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 20 of the Complaint.
- 21. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 21 of the Complaint, except admits that Allerton, on behalf of herself and the proposed plaintiff class members,

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00 SOUTH FOURTH ST. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 purports to seek a judgment against Defendant for alleged overtime wages, attorney's fees, interest, costs, and suitable equitable relief, as provided for by Nevada Law.

AS TO "A THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF JODI ALLERTON AND ALL PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED UNDER NEVADA LAW FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT"

- 22. Defendant repeats and realleges its answers to Paragraphs 1 through 21 as if set forth in full herein in response to Paragraph 22 of the Complaint.
- 23. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 23 of the Complaint, except admits that Allerton purports to bring the Third Claim for Relief for breach of contract under Nevada Law.
  - 24. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 24 of the Complaint.
  - 25. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 25 of the Complaint.
- 26. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 26 of the Complaint, except admits that Allerton, on behalf of herself and the proposed plaintiff class members, purports to seek a judgment against Defendant for alleged unpaid wages, attorney's fees, interest, costs, and suitable equitable relief, as provided for by Nevada Law.

AS TO "A [FOURTH (ERRONEOUSLY PLEAD AS THIRD)] CLAIM FOR RELIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF JODI ALLERTON AND ALL PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED UNDER N.R.S. § 608.040"

- 27. Defendant repeats and realleges its answers to Paragraphs 1 through 26 as if set forth in full herein in response to Paragraph 27 of the Complaint.
- 28. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 28 of the Complaint, except admits that Allerton was discharged from Sprint.
  - 29. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 29 of the Complaint.
- 30. Denies each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 30 of the Complaint, except admits that Allerton, on behalf of herself and alleged similarly situated members of the

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1 AS AND FOR A SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 2 38. Plaintiff's claims are barred in whole or in part, by the Statute of Frauds. 3 AS AND FOR AN EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 4 5 39. Neither Plaintiff, the putative class nor the class asserted herein, the existence of 6 which is expressly denied, meet the requirements of Nev. R. Civ. P. 23 or Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 7 AS AND FOR A NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 8 40. The named Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the prerequisites for class certification and, 9 10 therefore, lack standing and cannot represent the interests of others as to each of the purported 11 causes of action. 12 AS AND FOR A TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 13 14 41. Plaintiff is an inadequate representative of the alleged class of persons which 15 Plaintiff purports to represent, the existence of which is expressly denied. 16 AS AND FOR AN ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 17 18 42. The members of the putative class, the existence of which is expressly denied, are 19 not "similarly situated" to each other or to Plaintiff. 20 AS AND FOR A TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 21 43. Plaintiff and the putative class, the existence of which is expressly denied, cannot 22 23 satisfy the prerequisites of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///

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#### AS AND FOR A THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

44. Defendant has the right of recoupment and/or setoff against Plaintiff and each putative class member, the existence of which are expressly denied, who received compensation for hours they did not work and were not otherwise entitled to receive pay.

### AS AND FOR A FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

45. Plaintiff's and the putative class members' claims, the existence of which is expressly denied, are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

### AS AND FOR A FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

46. Plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of payment.

#### AS AND FOR A SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

47. Plaintiff's claim for damages is barred by accord and satisfaction in that Plaintiff has already received full payment of all monies due.

#### AS AND FOR A SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

48. Defendant reserves the right to raise additional affirmative defenses as may be discovered during the course of these proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court:

- a. Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice;
- b. Deny each and every prayer for relief contained in Plaintiff's Complaint;
- c. Award Defendant its reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses;
- d. Award Defendant its costs and disbursements incurred in defense of this action; and

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NEVADA 89101

## Case 2:09-cv-01325-RLH-GWF Document 1 Filed 07/21/09 Page 20 of 38

Award Defendant any other relief the Court deems just and proper. e. Dated: July \_\_\_, 2009 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS By: Kirby J. Smith 1700 Bank of America Plaza 300 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 383-8888 ksmith@lionelsawyer.com Attorneys for Defendant Sprint Nextel Corporation 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 day of July, 2009, I deposited a true and correct copy of I hereby certify that on the 2 the above and forgoing DEFENDANT SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION'S ANSWER 3 4 TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT in the United States Mail, postage prepaid at Las Vegas, 5 Nevada, to the last know address of: 6 Leon Greenberg, Esq. Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 7 633 South 4th Street, Suite 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 8 9 Christian Gabroy, Esq. Gabroy Law Offices 10 170 S. Green Valley Parkway, Suite 280 Henderson, Nevada 89012 11 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 12 13 14 15 An Employee of Lionel Sawyer & Collins 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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FILED

LEON GREENBERG, ESQ. NSB#: 8094
MARK R. THIERMAN, ESQ. NSB#: 8285
Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation
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(702) 385-1827(fax)

CHRISTIAN GABROY, ESQ. NSB#: 8805 Gabroy Law Offices 170 S. Green Valley Parkway - Suite 280 Henderson Nevada 89012

(702) 259-7777 (702) 259-7704 (fax)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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CLERK OF THE COURT

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> JODI ALLERTON, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,

> > Plaintiffs,

17 vs.

> SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION and ) JOHN DOES I through XXX, actual names and number unknown,


> > Defendants.

Case No.:

Dept. No.:

ARBITRATION EXEMPTION CLAIMED BECAUSE THIS IS A CLASS ACTION CASE

> A-09-592383-C 168429



CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTES AND BREACH OF CONTRACT

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, JODI ALLERTON, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, by and through her attorney, Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation, Mark Thierman and Christian

Gabroy, as and for a Complaint for Violation of State and Federal Statutes and Breach of Contract and Damages alleges as follows:

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#### PARTIES AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

- The plaintiff is a resident of Clark County, Nevada, and current employee of the defendant.
- 2. The defendant SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION ("Sprint") is a 8 corporation existing and established pursuant to the laws of the State of Kansas and conducts business in Nevada either directly or through one of the other JOHN DOE defendants as its agent or alter ego.
- The defendants JOHN DOES I through XXX, actual names 13 and number unknown, are one or more entities that are claimed to be liable, as a matter of law, for the various violation of statute, and breach of contract, claims made by the plaintiffs herein, and when such entities are properly identified it is intended that they will be named as defendants in this case under their proper names, such entities upon information and belief being wholly controlled subsidiaries or operating arms of the defendant Sprint.
  - 4. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims presented on the First Claim for Relief herein pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, known as the Fair Labor Standards Act ("the FLSA") and specifically under the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
  - 5. The acts complained of herein took place in Nevada, and primarily in Clark County.
  - 6. The defendants engage in for-profit businesses which have gross revenue in excess of \$500,000 per annum and are engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce and/or the use and/or

handling of goods which have moved in interstate commerce as such terms are defined in the FLSA and are employers subject to the jurisdiction of the FLSA.

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## THE PROPOSED CLASS CLAIMS AND PARTIES

- There are numerous persons who are similarly situated to 7. 7 the named plaintiff in respect to the named plaintiff's claims under Nevada Law, in that such similarly situated persons, like the named plaintiff, performed substantial work, labor and services for the defendants and did not receive the compensation required by the various Nevada Statutes alleged herein, and/or failed to receive the compensation required by their contracts of employment and as detailed hereafter such circumstances warrant the granting of class certification on such State Law claims of the plaintiff pursuant to N.R.C.P. Rule 23.
  - That the persons similarly situated to the named plaintiff and described in paragraph 7 constitute a class of persons that are so numerous that joinder of all such persons individually is impractical, such class consisting of all hourly wage earners of the defendants who were injured by the defendant's violations of Nevada's statutes, and defendant's breach of contract, that are detailed herein.
  - 9. There are questions of law and fact common to the plaintiff class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the plaintiff class, specifically whether the defendant has any legal obligation to the class members under Nevada Law and if so what is the extent of such obligation.
    - 10. The claims of the named plaintiff are typical of the

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claims of the above described plaintiff class, in that the interests of the named plaintiff are co-extensive with the interests of the other members of the plaintiff class, there is a lack of adverse interests between the named plaintiff and the other members of the plaintiff class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to the claims of the named plaintiff and the claims of the members of the plaintiff class.

- 11. The named plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the plaintiff class and serve as an adequate representative plaintiff on behalf of the plaintiff class.
- 12. A class action pursuant to N.R.C.P. Rule 23 is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the plaintiff class members' claims under Nevada Law.

AS AND FOR A FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF JODI ALLERTON AND ALL OTHER PERSONS WHO CHOOSE TO FILE A WRITTEN CONSENT TO JOIN THIS ACTION AS A PLAINTIFF PURSUANT TO 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

- 13. The plaintiff JODI ALLERTON ("the named plaintiff") brings this First Claim for Relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons who consent in writing to join this action as plaintiffs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and upon information and belief there are numerous such similarly situated persons.
- 14. Pursuant to the applicable provisions of the FLSA, including but not limited to 29 U.S.C. \$ 206 and \$ 207, the plaintiff was entitled to a minimum wage and an overtime hourly wage of time and one-half her regular hourly wage for all hours worked in

 excess of forty hours per week, the defendant employed the plaintiff, the plaintiff worked more than 40 hours per week for the defendant in the defendant's telephone customer call service center and defendant willfully failed to make said overtime and/or minimum wage payments by having the plaintiff and its other similarly situated employees perform "off the clock" work that the time consumed performing was neither recorded by the defendant nor paid by the defendant, but such amounts of time, although typically small in amount each work day, were constant and cumulatively considerable.

- 15. Defendant's failure to pay the plaintiff her proper wages as required under the FLSA arose from the following circumstance:
- (a) The plaintiff was required to work for certain periods of time during which he was paid nothing at all.
- 16. The named plaintiff on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated plaintiffs who consent in writing to join this action, seek, on this First Cause of Action, a judgment against defendants for unpaid overtime wages and/or minimum wages, such sums to be determined based upon an accounting of the hours worked by, and wages actually paid to, such plaintiffs, and also seeks an award of liquidated damages, attorney's fees, interest and costs as provided for by the FLSA.

AS AND FOR A SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF JODI ALLERTON AND ALL PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED PURSUANT TO NEVADA'S LABOR LAW

17. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates each and every allegation previously made herein.

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- 18. The named plaintiff brings this Second Claim for Relief against the defendant pursuant to NRS § 608.180 for non-payment of overtime wages on behalf of herself and the proposed plaintiff class members.
- Pursuant to NRS § 608,018 plaintiffs were also entitled 19. to the payment of wages at time and one-half their normal hourly 7 rate when they worked in excess of 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week, and the plaintiffs were not paid such required wages because they were denied any payment whatsoever for certain periods of time that they worked for the defendants and/or because they were not paid overtime wages calculated in compliance with the requirements of Nevada law.
  - 20. The defendants' actions in violating NRS \$ 608.018 were deliberate and repeated, the defendants having in the last five years been subjected to litigation over exactly such practices and despite such litigation and defendants' awareness of the illegality of such practices defendants have willfully continued such practices; defendants will continue to engage in such practices irrespective of an award of damages to the plaintiff class as the defendants profit greatly by such violations of law even after being required to pay damages for such violations of law in repeated litigations; and as a result of such circumstances an award of damages to the plaintiff class would be insufficient relief and the plaintiff class to protect themselves from the ongoing and continuing injury they will otherwise sustain from the defendants' conduct should receive suitable equitable relief, in the form of a preliminary and permanent injunction, the appointment of a limited receiver or Court supervised monitor, and such other appropriate

measures of equitable relief as are necessary to insure defendants comply with such statutes.

21. The named plaintiff on behalf of herself and the proposed plaintiff class members, seeks, on this Second Claim for Relief, a judgment against defendant for overtime wages, such sums to be determined based upon an accounting of the hours worked by, and wages actually paid to, the plaintiff and those similarly situated, and also seeks an award of attorney's fees, interest and costs, and suitable equitable relief, as provided for by Nevada Law.

AS AND FOR A THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF JODI ALLERTON AND ALL PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED UNDER NEVADA LAW FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

- 22. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates each and every allegation previously made herein.
- 23. The named plaintiff brings this third claim for relief for breach of contract under Nevada law.
- 24. The named plaintiff and those similarly situated to her all had contracts of employment with the defendants whereby the defendants agreed to pay such plaintiffs a certain set hourly wage for each hour and fraction thereof that they worked.
- 25. The defendant breached its contract with the plaintiff by failing to pay such promised hourly wages, specifically by failing to pay the plaintiff anything whatsoever for certain hours or portions thereof that she performed work for the defendant.
- 26. The named plaintiff on behalf of himself and the proposed plaintiff class members, seeks, on this Third Claim for Relief, a judgment against defendant for the unpaid wages owed to the named

plaintiff and the plaintiff class members as a result of the defendants' breach of its contract with the named plaintiff and the plaintiff class members, and also seeks an award of attorney's fees, interest and costs, as provided for by Nevada Law.

AS AND FOR A THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF JODI ALLERTON AND ALL PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED UNDER N.R.S. 5 608.040.

27. Plaintiff repeats and reiterates each and every allegation previously made herein.

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- 28. The individual plaintiff, and numerous members of the plaintiff class, prior to the initiation of this litigation, were discharged or resigned from their employment with the defendants and at the time of such discharge or resignation were owed unpaid wages by the defendants.
- 29. The defendants have failed and refused to pay such individual plaintiff and numerous members of the plaintiff class their earned but unpaid wages, such conduct by the defendants constituting a violation of N.R.S. \$ 608.020, or \$ 608.030 and giving rise to a claim under N.R.S. \$ 608.040.
- 30. As a result of the foregoing the individual plaintiff seeks on behalf of themselves and numerous similarly situated members of the plaintiff class, a judgment against the defendants for the penalty prescribed by Nevada Revised Statutes § 608.040, to wit, for a sum equal to up to thirty days wages, along with interest, costs and attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands the relief on each cause of action as alleged aforesaid, together with costs, interest, equitable relief, attorney's fees and such other relief as the Court deems

1	just.
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3	Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
4	Dated this <u>12th</u> day of June, 2009.
5	and the game day of oune, 2009.
6	Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation
7	& C
8	By: Dan
9	LEON GREENBERG, Esq. Nevada Bar No.: 8094 633 South 4th Street - Suite 4
10	633 South 4 <sup>th</sup> Street - Suite 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 383-6085
11	(702) 383-6085 Attorney for Plaintiff
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#### CONSENT TO JOINDER

by signing below, hereby consents to join this case as a plaintiff pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b).

gdi allerton

#### ORIGINAL

SUMM

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2 Leon Greenberg, NSB 8094 A Professional Corporation 633 S, 4th St., suite 4 Las Vegas, NV 89101 702-383-6085 Attorney for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JODI ALLERTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

Plaintiff(s).

-VS-

SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION and "John Doe" entities 1 to 25, name and number unknown,

**Defendants** 

M-095923834 DEPT. NO.

#### **SUMMONS - CIVIL**

NOTICE! YOU HAVE BEEN SUED. THE COURT MAY DECIDE AGAINST YOU WITHOUT YOUR BEING HEARD UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW.

TO THE DEFENDANT(S): A civil Complaint has been filed by the Plaintiff(s) against you for the relief set forth in the Complaint.

- If you intend to defend this lawsult, within 20 days after this Summons is served on you, exclusive of the day of service, you must do the following:
  - (a) File with the Clerk of this Court, whose address is shown below, a formal written response to the Complaint in accordance with the rules of the Court, with the appropriate filing fee.

SUMM Civil/6/12/2009

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Submitted by:

702-383-6085

ON GREENBERG. ESC

633 S. 4th Street, Suite 4

Las Vegas, NV 89101

Attorney for Plaintiffs

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- (b) Serve a copy of your response upon the attorney whose name and address is shown below.
- 2. Unless you respond, your default will be entered upon application of the Plaintiff(s) and failure to so respond will result in a judgment of default against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint, which could result in the taking of money or property or other relief requested in the Complaint.
- 3. If you intend to seek the advice of an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your response may be filed on time.
- 4. The State of Nevada, its political subdivisions, agencies, officers, employees, board members, commission members and legislators each have 45 days after service of this Summons within which to file an Answer or other responsive pleading to the Complaint.

CLERK OF THE COURT

By: 1 / 1. Craft

JUN 1 2 2009 Date

MARY ANDERSON

Deputy Clerk

Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89155

NOTE: When service is by publication, add a brief statement of the object of the action. See Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 4(b)

SUMM Civil/6/12/2009

	AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE STATE OF NEVADA ) ss:		
	COUNTY OF CLARK )		
•	്രിയ <u>Daws</u>   being duly swom, says: That at all times herein affiant was and is over		
. •	18 years of age, not a party to nor interested in the proceeding in which this affidavit		
7	is made. That affiant received copy(ies) of the Summons and Complaint,		
٠	on the 19 day of Jowe, 20 09 and served the same on the 12 day		
, 6	of June, 20 09 by:		
10	(Afflant must complete the appropriate paragraph)		
11	Delivering and leaving a copy with the Defendant at (state address)		
12			
13	2. Serving the Defendant by personally delivering and leaving a copy with		
14	, a person of suitable age and discretion residing at the Defendant's		
15	usual place of abode located at (state address)		
16	[Use paragraph 3 for service upon agent, completing (a) or (b)]		
. 18	3. Serving the Defendant by personally delivering and leaving a copy at Coreporation Service Company (state address) தன் தன் தன் தன் இரை		
19	•		
20	(a) With as, an agent lawfully designated by statute to accept service of process;		
21	(b) With, pursuant to NRS 14.020 as a person of suitable age and		
22	discretion at the above address, which address is the address of the		
23	resident agent as shown on the current certificate of designation filed		
24	with the Secretary of State. Seeved Theresa Burws		
. 25	4. Personally depositing a copy in a mail box of the United States Post Office,		
- 26	enclosed in a sealed envelope, postage prepaid (Check appropriate method):		
27	☐ Ordinary mail		
28	Certified mail, return receipt requested Registered mail, return receipt requested		
	3 SUMM Civil/6/12/2009		

1005/005

addressed to the Defendant \_\_\_\_\_ at Defendant's last known address which is (state address) I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct. EXECUTED this 32 day of June 20 09. Signature of person making service John F. Donnelly AMFUST Delivery 3900 SW 40TH TERR Topeky Ks 66610 1785-249-2358 SUMM Civil/8/12/2009

## EXHIBIT 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF	
JODI ALLERTON, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,  Plaintiffs,	
against SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION and JOHN DOES I through XXX, actual names and number unknown,	
Defendants.	X
AFFIDAVIT OF TA STATE OF COLORADO )	YLOR KITCHIN
) ss.	

Taylor Kitchin deposes and says under penalty of perjury:

**COUNTY OF DOUGLAS** 

- 1. I am Taylor Kitchin, a Human Resource Manager for Sprint Nextel

  Corporation. The facts set forth herein are true based on my personal knowledge of the records available to me as they are kept in the ordinary course of business, my general knowledge of the business practices of Sprint, and information provided to me by persons upon whom I regularly rely in the course of my duties.
- 2. Plaintiff Jodi Allerton ("Allerton") was employed by Sprint from November 5, 2007 through March 12, 2009.
  - 3. Upon her departure from Sprint, Allerton's hourly wage was \$12.8625.

4. During her employment with Sprint, Allerton worked, on average, 42.88 hours per week, including paid time off.

Sworn to before me this 20day of 1/1/200

Notary Public